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^Abstract
The Czech social-security system is hampered by the ageing population, similarly as
all European systems. The discussion of remedies is still very rudimentary. Pro-reform
arguments concentrate on the non-sustainability of the current system in the long term
and on the miserable returns the system produces for the taxpayers. Funded systems are
consequentially quoted as a viable alternative. The main argument of the non-reformers,
on the contrary, rests with the sky-high costs of such a reform and on the societal instincts
that may clash within an attempt. 
In this paper, we try to carry out an objective and comprehensive appraisal of the
implicit debt of the Czech social-security system. Such an estimate would be crucial if a
reform, at least partially based on the switch to a funded system, were to be conceived.
Currently, the government is considering no such reform. Therefore, for the short-term
fiscal outlook, costs of unreformed system should be taken into account. In a longer-
term, though, future governments will have to deal with the pension system and
implement some aspects of the pension reform. 
We show that the current social-security system based on the PAYG principle is
heavily indebted, though the debt is thus far implicit. Taken all parts of the system
together, the Czech social security system has accumulated debt in excess of 250% GDP ,
level similar to other European countries. The debt level is, indeed sensitive to the
valorisation coefficient. Should the future governments apply very restrictive policies and
keep social security benefits fixed in real terms, the overall implicit debt would decrease
to 199% of GDP . On the other hand, more generous valorisation by 4% in real terms
would lift the implicit debt to 324% of GDP .
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The Czech social-security system embodies the very same flaws now facing all
developed industrialised countries. Its current framework is shaped by the slowly expiring
contract between generations, based on the underlying assumption of ever-increasing
wages and a stable or slightly rising active populations share. Those conditions have
proved short-lived, however, and all countries now struggle to amend their social-
security systems; firstly, through pension reform. The main pro-reform argument
concentrates on the non-sustainability of the current system in the long term and on the
miserable returns the system produces for the taxpayers [1]. Funded systems are
consequentially quoted as a viable alternative [2]. While many reforms have been
attempted, a systematic and comprehensive reform remains rare. The main argument of
the non-reformers, on the contrary, rests with the sky-high costs of such a reform and on
the societal instincts that may clash within an attempt. 
In this paper, we try to carry out an objective and comprehensive appraisal of the implicit
debt of the Czech social-security system. Such an estimate would be crucial if a reform, at
least partially based on the switch to a funded system, were to be conceived. Currently, no
such reform is being considered by the Czech government that even campaigned for rolling
back a few reforms which had been implemented by previous governments. Therefore, for
the short-term fiscal outlook, costs of unreformed system should be taken into account. In
a longer-term, though, future governments will have to deal with the pension system and
implement some aspects of the pension reform discussed below. 
We should note, however, that our estimate reflects extreme costs, which would be
incurred only if the current system were terminated immediately and entirely for all
citizens, working or retired. It should, therefore, serve as a benchmark rather than a
reform cost estimate. 
2. Social-security Systems at Crossroads
The Czech social-security system, which distributes more than 20% of its GDP , is going
through a turbulent and extremely important phase of development. While the underlying
6
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[1] It is to be noted, however, than the PAYG systems often do produce excellent returns for low-income
workers.
[2] See Kotlikoff (1996) for an excellent discussion of the issue.trends are as worrying as elsewhere in the developed and transition countries, the short-
term accounts look almost balanced and a thorough reform does not seem imminent. For
the purpose of this paper we leave aside the health-care system, currently spending as
much as 8% of the Czech GDP . The health system has been separated from the state
budget and is run by a quasi-governmental organisation quango (General Health Insurance).
Instead, we concentrate on the pension system and the system of social security for
the disabled. These two systems consume almost one third of the government budget
and 14% of GDP (CZK 235 bn in 1999, CZK 223 bn in 1998). Therefore, concentrating
on them we cover the bulk of the Czech social-security system. Moreover, only old-age
and disabled pensions represent a proper insurance scheme and may be dealt with as
insurance programmes.
Governments in the transition countries often stress that private agents are not ready
to embrace full-scale pension reform, as they are used to the old, state-dominated
systems. Officials maintain that depending exclusively on voluntary private savings would
bring the pension system, and indeed the whole of the economy, to a collapse. The main
argument cited is individual behaviour  the short-sightedness of people who do not save
adequately for their old age and are dependent on state assistance. Inadequate financial
instruments, the propensity of the financial institutions in transition countries to fail, and
information gaps are also cited as obstacles for private savings along side state-social
security. If we add the classical market failure arguments  adverse selection, moral
hazard  the case for private old-age insurance seems almost lost.
Nevertheless, these arguments fail to address the scale of the problems faced by
the state-pension systems in the transition countries, as well as in the developed
countries. The high and rising cost of the current social-security system already
represents a main obstacle to a more dynamic economic growth in the transition
countries that would hoist the economies to levels approaching those of the developed
countries. First, the transition countries are just beginning to feel the demographic
pinch of the increasing shares of pensioners as their populations age [3]. Second, the
relatively generous pension benefits promised by these states hamper development of
the private-pension funds and the insurance market at large. Third, widespread
manipulation and evasion seriously affect the social-security systems. This results in
higher benefits paid and a lower contribution collected by the state and thus
exacerbates the social-security balance. Last, but not least, social-security systems in
the transition countries are perilously under funded. The reason is that they operate on
7
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[3] This does not hold for Russia, where the expected lifetime has been actually decreasing for last years.
Though this development does relieve the Russian pension system of some acute problems, it is not to be
envied.the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis, which is ill suited to cope with the ageing of
populations and raising costs. 
It is fair to say that PAYG pension systems can be altered to accommodate the
changing demographic environment. The most discussed modification of the basic PAYG
system would be to set contributions on a long-term equilibrium level, which would take
into account future demographic changes. As this long-term level appears to be above
the current contribution level in all countries, it is a politically ungrateful task, requiring
formidable foresight from a government. 
3. Czech Pension System  Deficits in the Pipeline
The pension system in the Czech Republic is as fallible as any other mature PAYG
system operating in an ageing society. As the share of elderly in the entire population
increases financing the pension system form payroll taxes begins to be too expensive. If
the future governments keep the current level of contributions (26% of the wage bill),
the PAYG exhibits consistent deficits  see Table 1. Assuming a 3% real return on
investment (or 3% real interest rate to be paid later on loan), the system would
accumulate a debt of more than 40% of GDP in 2020. The debt would be equal to 100%
of GDP around the year 2035 and more than 180% of GDP in 2060. The sheer size of
these numbers suggests that the current system is not sustainable.
Table 1. Annual Deficits of the Czech Pension System in 19992010
(CZK bn and %GDP)
As seen from the table, the Czech pension system runs consistent deficits below 1%
of GDP until 2007. This is the year when the retirement age will reach 62 for men and
5961 for women. As of now, the retirement age should then be fixed at these levels.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Deficit (CZK bn.
94 prices)
-8.0 -8.5 -9.0 -9.5 -10.0 -11.1
Deficit (% GDP) -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Deficit (CZK bn.
94 prices)
-10.3 -11.7 -12.9 -19.6 -23.4 -27.5
Deficit (% GDP) -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5However, as the population continues to grey costs of the pensions will balloon and the
deficit will reach 1,5% of GDP in 2010 (and 3,2% of GDP in 2020). 
There is an alternative, of course. The pension system could be kept balanced by
raising the contribution rate on a regular basis. If we ignore all general equilibrium effects
of higher contributions (lower employment, shadow economy), the contribution rate
would have to increase from current 26% of wages to 31% in 2010 (and to 36,7% in
2020)  see Table 2.
Table 2. Social Security Contributions Balancing the Czech Pension System 
in 1999  2010 (% of wage)
The situation was not too different in other transition countries. However, as
Hungarians and Poles have introduced pensions reforms based on the three-pillar system,
their systems are undergoing a systematic change, which is dealt by in the Gomulkas
paper. However, regardless reforms, the sheer scale of the welfare-state cash provisions,
which have been left over from the previous regimes, is alarming given the economic
position of the countries concerned. Pensions consume about 10% of GDP in Hungary
and Czech Republic and even 14% of GDP in Poland, and contribution rates are as high
as 30% of wages in Hungary and Poland. These shares are even higher than in a number
of the OECD countries and bear no comparison to shares in the newly industrialised
countries of East Asia. The scale of the welfare state negatively influences saving rates [4],
discourages labour mobility and hampers the development of capital markets. As a result,
the growth potential of these countries is seriously reduced. While the various measures
aimed at trimming costs are highly desirable and help to maintain the overall balance, the
need for a thorough reform is mounting.
While the Poles and Hungarians have seemingly understood the flaws within the
PAYG pension systems, Czechs have remained faithful to the system, so far. However, the
fiscal strains will force a change in the system, regardless of the tinkering on the margin.
PAYG systems currently predominant are doomed to be abandoned, at least in their
dominant role, sooner or later. Meanwhile, countries need to concentrate on building
9
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[4] See Feldstein (1996) The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform, Richard T. Ely
Lecture, American Economic Revue, May 1996.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Rate (% of wages) 27.2 27.1 27.3 27.5 27.7 27.8
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Rate (% of wages) 28.0 28.6 29.4 30.1 30.5 31.0prerequisites for a system that would be sustainable in the long term, enable the retired
to maintain a decent living standard and which would, at the same time, reduce the risk
of myopic behaviour of the younger generations.
4. Change of the System
An alternative is to switch from the PAYG system to a funded (or actuarial fair)
system. The funded systems are better suited to cope with the demographic shocks that
the industrialised countries are now facing. Moreover, the funded systems facilitate higher
rates of savings, which in turn support higher capital investment, higher returns to labour
and, consequently, a higher rate of economic growth. Last, but not least, the funded
systems have a distinctive appeal in that they limit government clout over the economy,
facilitate individuals responsiveness and economically rational behaviour, punish myopic
and reckless behaviour, and by all these means, abate the moral hazard problems which
are hampering the state-run PAYG systems.
However, a change from the current system, based on the PAYG principle, to a
funded system would make explicit the so-far implicit debt accumulated by the old
system, which does not provision for future payments. This debt is often cited as the
insurmountable barrier for any reform proposal. It is, however, rarely estimated, as any
estimate has to rely on a number of assumptions. Nevertheless, we believe that an
estimate is needed and may provide an indication as to what problems the current
system is headed. 
The implicit debt consists of two parts. First, the currently retired pensioners have to
be paid their pensions in the future as they have not created the savings to provide for
themselves. The capital missing for the payment of future pensions is a potential public
debt, but it is not officially acknowledged. Second, all current workers have already
acquired some pension rights. The capital represented by those rights is another form of
the implicit public debt of the present pension system.
We strive to estimate the two classes of implicit public debt using methodology
proposed by Gomulka and Jaworski [5]. We have adopted several modifications, though,
as the Czech social-security system diverges from the Polish one in some aspects.
Nevertheless, the results are comparable in all-important aspects.
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[5] See Gomulka and Jaworski (1998).5. Estimation Methodology
For each of the two classes of debt we use a specific method. For the class of people
who are already pensioners we use the following approach. Suppose a specific benefit in
the initial year is Y0, and assume that its rate of growth g will be constant in the future for
all types of pensions, regardless of the age or sex of the pensioner. Following Gomulka
and Jaworski, we estimate the amount of capital that would guarantee to pay benefits Y1,
Y2,,YT during an expected lifetime T. The solution to this problem is:
(1)
The required initial capital is thus the present value of all future payments: Y1, Y2,YT,
with the rate of return r being the discount rate. To make our estimate as precise as
possible, we use both Y0 and T specific for a particular group of pensioners in 1998, which
we take as the year when the pension system is reformed. We assume 41 age groups
(cohorts) for each sex and for all pension types. There are old-age pensions, full- and
partial-disability pensions and survivors pensions. All these pensions are awarded to men
and women, but so far men survivors pensions do not figure in the system. The capital
K0 is estimated separately for each group, characterised by age, type of pension, and sex
category. The numbers Y0 and T vary as between groups, but both are assumed to be
common for all members of any single specific group. 
The pension rights of those not yet retired are estimated using a similar methodology.
However, we had to include all age groups beginning with those aged 20, as they have already
accumulated pension rights. These rights were estimated as either the average pension people
from the same age cohort are awarded when they retire (applicable for cohorts above age
50) or either as the proportional part of the average pension awarded in 1998. Proportion was
taken as a share of a cohort working age (actual age  20 years) in the average lifetime working
time. Having estimated these accrued pension rights it is straightforward to apply the same
methodology for people still working as for those already retired.
6. Calibration
Crucial parameters in the models described above are coefficients of pensions
valorisation g and the discount rate r. In our model, we assume that the valorisation
11











( Y Kcoefficient g is identical for all types of pensions, as has been the case in the Czech
Republic since 1993. The average real valorisation in the last five years was 2%, which we
take as the benchmark value. For a comparison, we estimated the implicit debt with
other valorisation indexes, namely 0% and 4%. The discount factor, r, is taken to be
equal 3%, in order to be comparable to other calculations by other authors and following
Gomulka and Jaworski.
We used data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs that included
information on old-age pensions, disability (full and partial) pensions and survivors
pensions. Old-age pensions are broken down to 41 age cohorts from 50- to 90-year-old
pensioners, disability and survivors pensions are reported for age cohorts from 20 to 90
years.
The age distribution of newly granted old-age pensions is fascinating. It shows that the
so-called new pensioners are granted pensions much higher than an average pension
(CZK 6540 for men and CZK 5440 for women). Highest pensions are awarded to men
aged 5557, i.e., early-retiring men. This presents a double burden for the pension
system, as these men not only draw pensions longer than others do, but they also receive
higher pensions. This is a result of the pension act amendment, passed in 1997. The
development in newly retired womens pensions is less pronounced, as the maximum
pensions are awarded to women aged 59.
Women are granted an earlier retirement than men are in the Czech system, even
though women live longer. This peculiarity, common to all transition countries, translates
in higher requirements of capital needed for financing womens old-age pensions. On the
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Figure 1. Pensions Awarded by Age and Sexother hand, however, the average pension granted to women is significantly lower than
for men (see Figure 1). This aspect more than eliminates the lower lifetime aspect and
the capital needed for financing pensions is generally lower for a woman of the same age
than for a man.
Survivors pensions were previously granted to widows only, but since 1993 the
pension has been extended to widowers, as well. The data we used, however, included
the very low number of widowers among the survivors group. In doing so, we negligibly
over-estimate the implicit capital needed for financing widowers pensions, as their
expected lifetime is lower than that of widows of the same age. Given the relatively low
amount required for the survivors pensions, this omission does not influence our results
in a significant manner. 
The life-expectancy data are taken from the MLSA as well, and they cover annual
cohorts of men and women aged 20 to 90. They significantly influence results, as the
higher expected lifetime requires a higher capital to cover financing pensions for a longer
period. It is remarkable how life expectancy has increased significantly since 1989 in the
Czech Republic (by almost 4 years for men and by 2 years for women). 
7. Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarise main results of our simulations. In both tables, we present
results of three different simulations, in which we alter the valorisation coefficient g. As
the benchmark alternative should serve the medium one, with valorisation equal to 2%
annually. Results show that the Czech social security system is indeed heavily indebted.
Main culprit is pension system, which promises too high pensions in future without
actually provisioning for it. As the Table 4 shows, implicit debt amounts to 76% of GDP
for men still employed and 77% of GDP for women employed. In other words, these
workers have already accrued rights exceeding 150% of the whole GDP . 
In addition, already retired pensioners rely on the system for their future pensions,
but the system has no provisions for this, either. Taking retired males and females
together, the pension system has created additional implicit debt 61% of GDP . Lastly,
the Czech social security system provides disability (full and partial) and survivors
pensions. Their future financing would require setting 37% of GDP aside. 
Taken altogether, the Czech social security system has accumulated debt in excess of
250% GDP , level similar to other European countries (see Herd, den Noord 1993). The
debt level is, indeed sensitive to the valorisation coefficient. Should the future
13






















































Already Retired Working Already Retired Working
Old-
age
Disability Partial Total Total Old-
age
Disability Partial Survivor Total Total Total
G=0% 397 185 62 643 1,050 530 154 45 52 781 1,040 3,520
G=2% 450 231 79 760 1,340 632 203 61 67 963 1,370 4,430
G=4% 511 296 104 912 1,760 762 277 87 88 1,210 1,860 5,740
Men Women
Already Retired Working Already Retired Working
Old-
age
Disability Partial Total Total Old-
age
Disability Partial Survivor Total Total Total
G=0% 22% 10% 3% 36% 59% 30% 9% 3% 3% 44% 59% 199%
G=2% 25% 13% 4% 43% 76% 36% 11% 3% 4% 77% 77% 251%
G=4% 29% 17% 6% 52% 99% 43% 16% 5% 5% 69% 105% 324%
Table 3. Implicit Debt in CZK bn. (baseline scenario, r = 3%)
Table 4. Implicit Debt in % GDPgovernments apply very restrictive policies and keep social security benefits fixed in real
terms (i.e. set the valorisation coefficient to 0%), the overall implicit debt would decrease
to 199% of GDP . On the other hand, more generous valorisation by 4% in real terms
would lift the implicit debt to 324% of GDP . Therefore, the medium estimate, 251% of
GDP , seems a reasonable compromise. 
8. Conclusions
We have shown that the current social-security system based on the PAYG principle
is heavily indebted, though the debt is thus far implicit. However, this implicit debt
represents an estimate of costs that will be faced by Czech taxpayers in future. It will be
either in the form of higher taxes and/or lower pensions, or in the form of debt incurred
during a pension reform. While it is clear that the costs of pension reform are very high,
the current system accumulates debt that reform costs would pale in comparison.
Furthermore, a pension reform could increase the long-term rates of growth and
thus benefit future generations, as it has been argued elsewhere [6]. There seems to be
broad agreement that the reform can even be done in a Pareto-efficient way, so that
current pensioners and older contributors would not suffer a loss in their lifetime income.
To achieve these desired results, the reform needs not only careful planning but also a
well functioning network of private financial institutions that would facilitate private
savings and secure returns on savings that would encourage the further development of
the private-pension schemes. As the Czech experience seems to suggest, it is extremely
unlikely that such a strong network would emerge without a substantial and radical
pension reform which would divert a major part of pension savings to the private-pension
funds. It remains to be seen whether the Czech Republic will find the courage and
determination to reform its inadequate pension system. It needs to do so, sooner rather
than later.
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[6] See, for example, Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Privatization of Social Security: How It Works and Why It
Matters, NBER Working Paper, 1996; or Averting the Old Age Crisis, World Bank Policy Research Report,
Oxford University Press, 1994.16
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Figure 3. Capital Requirement  Working Women17
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Figure 7. Implicit Debt of the Czech Social Security (in CZK bn.)References
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